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(詳細はnaval leader in Germany who played a major role in the Naval history of World War II. Raeder attained the highest possible naval rank—that of ''Großadmiral'' (Grand Admiral) — in 1939, becoming the first person to hold that rank since Alfred von Tirpitz. Raeder led the ''Kriegsmarine'' (German War Navy) for the first half of the war; he resigned in 1943 and was replaced by Karl Dönitz. He was sentenced to life in prison at the Nuremberg Trials, but was released early due to failing health. Raeder is also well known for dismissing Reinhard Heydrich from the Reichsmarine in April 1931 for "conduct unbecoming to an officer and a gentleman". This article covers Raeder's activities during World War II. ==Beginning of the war: Raeder's political-naval plan== When Britain and France declared war on Germany on 3 September 1939, Raeder was shocked and shattered by the outbreak of a general war that for the ''Kriegsmarine'' was at least five years too early.〔Thomas p. 187.〕 Raeder wrote in the ''Seekriegsleitung'' war diary on 3 September 1939: "Today the war against England and France, which the ''Führer'' had previously assured us we would not have to confront until 1944 and which he believed he could avoid up until the very last minute, began ...Owing to the fact that the great fleet envisioned in Plan Z existed only in blue-prints or had just began to be built, Raeder like Tirpitz before him in 1914 was forced to abandon his pre-war plans for a great naval battle in the North Sea, and instead embrace the ''guerre de course'' strategy that he had previously been opposed to.〔Thomas p. 188.〕 The disparity in size between the Royal Navy and the Kriegsmarine meant the great ''Entscheidungsschlacht'' in the Mahan-Tirpitz mold that Raeder planned before the war could only end in the destruction of the German force. Raeder's strategy which was a modified version of the "double pole strategy" he had devised before the war called for the ''Panzerschiffe'', auxiliary cruisers and submarines to attack British merchantmen all over the world to force the Royal Navy to divert its strength while at the same time the main surface ships would make frequent raids into the North Sea to gradually reduce the Royal Navy's strength.〔 Raeder had great hopes for the auxiliary cruisers which he sent to the Pacific, Indian and South Atlantic oceans to tie down British warships all over the globe.〔Weinberg ''A World at Arms'' p. 369.〕 To get around the problem of the lack of bases outside of Germany and the shortage of ''Dithmarschen''-class ships, Raeder had the Foreign Office in late 1939 negotiate secret agreements with Japan, Spain and the Soviet Union allowing German ships and submarines to use the ports of those nations to resupply, refuel and rearm.〔Bird ''Erich Raeder'' p. 141.〕 Owing to the shortage of surface vessels, Raeder's strategy was very much a ''guerre de course'' strategy that he reluctantly followed because the U-boats were the only offensive weapons at his disposal.〔 Raeder's strategy was much as political as naval.〔 Having spent the last six years championing to Hitler sea power as the only way in which Germany could become a world power, Raeder was anxious that the ''Kriegsmarine'' be seen as doing more than its share of the fighting to ensure that Hitler would reward the Navy by not cutting its budget after the war.〔 Raeder was obsessed with the fear that "the war would end before the heavy units had been engaged" and that the sailors would "fail" in their duty to the fatherland "due to inactivity", the last a veiled reference to the mutiny of 1918.〔Herwig p. 98.〕 In a message sent to all officers in June 1940, Raeder exclaimed: "The great aim of the ''Führer'' has set forth for the German nation requires the utmost exertion in all places ... A navy which undertakes daring actions against the enemy and suffers losses through this will be reborn on an even larger scale. If it has not fought this action, then its existence will be threatened after the war".〔As part of the "double pole strategy", mines were laid off the coast of Britain while submarines and merchant raiders were sent out to the Atlantic.〔Weinberg ''A World at Arms'' p. 70.〕 In the first days of the war, submarines were ordered not to practice unrestricted submarine warfare as Hitler had hopes that Britain and France might make peace after the conquest of Poland, and feared that too many "incidents" at sea involving neutral shipping might bring the United States into the war as unrestricted submarine warfare had in 1917.〔 In support of Hitler's diplomatic strategy, Raeder ordered the skipper of the submarine that sank the to falsify the log-book in order to support the German claim that the sinking of the ''Athenia'' on 3 September 1939 was a British provocation intended to fool the United States into declaring war on Germany.〔 A major factor that assisted the ''Kriegsmarines war against British commerence was that the B-Dienst as the German naval intelligence was known had broken many of the British codes before the war.〔Weinberg ''A World at Arms'' p. 71.〕 In September 1939 to further concentrate power in his hands, Raeder created two Naval Group Commands, namely Naval Command West and Naval Command East that operated between the fleet commands and the naval headquarters in Berlin.〔Herwig p. 96.〕 The Canadian historian Holger Herwig argued that Raeder wanted a splinted command structure in order to increase his power, and that adding an extra layer of bureaucracy was unhelpful to efficiency.〔 In the same way, Raeder always refused to appoint an flag officer with command experience to act as the liaison with the OKW out of the fear that such an officer might be a threat to his power.〔Herwig p. 102.〕 As much as possible, Raeder tried to avoid co-operation with the Army and the Air Force, and as such Germany never had a joint chiefs of staff or anything like it during the war to prepare a coordinated strategy.〔 Like Hitler, Raeder viewed Britain rather than France as the main opponent, and accordingly favored focusing on defeating the United Kingdom first.〔Weinberg ''A World at Arms'' p. 110.〕 A major problem for the ''Kriegsmarine'' was like in World War I, it was difficult to attack the shipping in the Western Approaches to the British Isles from the North Sea, which was likewise difficult to break out from because of the British blockade.〔Weinberg ''A World at Arms'' p. 113.〕 Raeder at first favored an offensive to defeat France in order to use the ports on the French Atlantic coast to attack shipping in the Western Approaches, only to be informed by General Franz Halder of the Army General Staff that the Army's current plans for a western offensive called for the Army to seize northern France and the Low Countries, which would be used as a basis for a final offensive to defeat France sometime in 1942; in the interim the areas seized would be used as the basis for launching air attacks on Britain.〔 The Manstein Plan for a swift victory over France was not adopted until February 1940. Learning of the Army's western offensive plans in September 1939 led Raeder to turn his thoughts towards Norway. On a meeting on 10 October 1939, Raeder pressed Hitler for an invasion of Norway, unrestricted submarine warfare and to declare war on the United States if too many "incidents" involving the sinking of neutral ships led to American support of the Allies.〔Weinberg ''A World at Arms'' p. 86.〕 The American historian Gerhard Weinberg wrote that Raeder was repeating "... the German navy leadership's argument of 1916 unaffected by the experience of 1917-18".〔 Hitler gave his approval for unrestricted submarine warfare, but also stressed to Raeder that he did not want the United States in the war at this junction in time.〔 Reflecting his concern with the political aspects of his plan, namely to gain enough glory at sea to win post-war budget battles, Raeder was furious with the outcome of the Battle of the River Plate.〔Bird ''Erich Raeder'' p. 143.〕 The captain of the , Hans Langsdorff, believing that his damaged ship was faced with a superior British force, chose to scuttle his ship to spare the lives of his men.〔 Both Hitler and Raeder believed that Langsdorff should have fought the British and gone down fighting, even if it meant the deaths of most or all of the crew of ''Admiral Graf Spee''.〔 Raeder, knowing that Hitler was very displeased with the Navy as a result of the River Plate, issued orders that henceforth naval commanders were not to concern themselves with the lives of their crews, and were to go down fighting.〔 Raeder's order of 22 December 1939, intended to avoid a repeat of the scuttling of the ''Admiral Graf Spee'', read: "The German warship and her crew are to fight with their strength to the last shell, until they win or they go down with their flag flying. Once engaged, the battle is to be fought to the finish."〔After the Battle of the River Plate, the ''Flottenchef'' Admiral Hermann Boehm was made the scapegoat for the scuttling of the ''Admiral Graf Spee'' and was sacked by Raeder.〔 Raeder's deputy, Admiral Rolf Carls wrote with pride in his diary in October 1941 that "all our forces have been deployed so often and so recklessly that never can the charge of tepidity be levelled against us".〔Herwig p. 100.〕 Admiral Wilhelm Marschall after the war was to call Raeder's strategy as "wishful and prestige thinking, fateful overestimation of Germany's political and military possibilities, unfounded underestimation of the enemy England, and nonsensical insistence upon operational thoughts tied to the Z Plan", a naval strategy based upon "phantasy, prestige-seeking and playing vabanque".〔 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Erich Raeder during World War II」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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